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When the Shoe is on the Other Foot:
Experimental Evidence on Valuation Disparities
Abstract
The method of elicitation has an important effect on valuations. We investigate the effect
of perspective on decision makers’ elicited values. We conduct experimental sessions in
which participants act as sellers or buyers and replicate the disparity between willingness
to accept and willingness to pay: sellers want to collect more and buyers want to pay less.
We conduct additional sessions in which endowed decision makers provide values that
are used to determine a price at which anonymous others transact. In these sessions,
decision makers’ experimental earnings are not affected by valuations, but rather
determined by their endowment. Decision makers appear to consider their standing
relative to anonymous others in providing valuations, i.e., decision makers’ endowments
affect their valuations. The results indicate that the disparity between willingness to
accept and willingness to pay disappears when decision makers’ endowment ensures that
they are at least as well off as anonymous others.
Keywords: willingness to accept, willingness to pay, valuation disparity, perspective
taking, mediation
JEL: C91, C92

When the Shoe is on the Other Foot:
Experimental Evidence on Valuation Disparities
1. INTRODUCTION
Mediation is often used to settle disagreements, including environmental
conflicts, civil unrest, labor-management disputes, and divorce cases. The practice is
commonly embraced as a low cost means to resolve disputes. But for mediation to be
successful, the parties need to recognize one another’s perspective (e.g., Korobkin 2006).
Understanding the valuation of adversaries can be critical to avoid impasse and achieve
settlement. Prior findings indicate that an individual’s ability to take the perspective of
another, and thereby consider another’s valuation more objectively, can have a marked
effect on conflict resolution (e.g., Neale and Bazerman 1983; Thompson and Hastie
1990; Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001). Successful mediators may be particularly adept at
taking the perspective of others.
Previous studies suggest that an individual’s perspective or role underlies
valuation disparities (e.g., Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden 1986; Van Boven, Dunning,
and Loewenstein 2000; Van Boven, Loewenstein, and Dunning, 2003). Individuals
provide far different valuations when put in the role of a seller versus a buyer. In an
extensive review of the literature, Horowitz and McConnell (2002) estimate that the
minimum compensation necessary to relinquish a good (i.e., willingness to accept or
WTA) is approximately seven times higher than the maximum amount paid to acquire the
good (i.e., willingness to pay or WTP).1 The assigned role effectively creates a
perspective from which valuations are based: sellers want to collect more and buyers
want to pay less.

Individuals have difficulty setting aside their perspective and fully
comprehending another’s point of view. As the old adage goes, it is difficult to walk in
someone else’s shoes. Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein (2000) conduct
experiments in which mug owners estimate buyers’ average purchase price and mug
buyers estimate owners’ average selling price. They find that owners overestimate
buyers’ average purchase price and buyers underestimate owners’ selling price.
Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden (1986) examine the assessments of individuals
acting on behalf of others. In their experiments, an advisor evaluates whether another
should pay a fixed amount for a lottery ticket (WTP) or accept a fixed sum (WTA). The
results indicate that advisors’ decisions differ significantly from those of participants who
answer on their own behalf. When advisors make decisions, there is no evidence of a gap
between WTP and WTA. However, the study does not elicit values, but rather focuses on
decisions about buying or selling entitlements. Our experiment differs from Marshall,
Knetsch, and Sinden’s in that we use an incentive compatible elicitation mechanism and
vary the endowment of the decision maker. Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden’s advisors
were not compensated.
In another study, Van Boven, Loewenstein, and Dunning (2003) have participants
act as buyers’ agents, with earnings contingent on their ability to estimate owner’s selling
prices. The study’s findings indicate that agents’ offers are too low: buyers’ agents
underestimate the owner’s selling price. Once again, it is difficult to fully comprehend
another’s perspective.
We experimentally investigate the effect of perspective on individuals’ valuations
and whether participants provide objective valuations for others. Initially we conduct
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sessions in which participants (decision makers) give valuations on their own behalf. We
replicate earlier findings and document a sizable disparity between WTA and WTP:
participants require more to relinquish a good than they offer to acquire it. In subsequent
sessions, decision makers provide valuations on behalf of others (adherents). Our results
suggest that decision makers’ wealth relative to that of adherents affects the elicited
values. When decision makers are at least as well off as adherents – in terms of
experimental earnings – they are able to provide objective valuations. Under such
conditions, we do not find a significant difference between valuations under WTA and
WTP.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The experimental design,
discussed subsequently, is summarized in Table 1. Sections 2, 3, and 4 detail the
experimental method and results for each treatment. Section 5 contains a discussion of
the findings, along with concluding remarks and implications for dispute resolution.

2. The Base Treatment
We conduct six sessions in the base treatment and each session includes eight
participants, giving a total of 48 participants. Each session consists of a series of ten
trials and requires approximately 30 minutes. Participants’ are students at a mediumsized university located in the Southeastern U.S. and all are inexperienced in that no one
took part in more than one session.2 At the beginning of each session, participants
receive a set of instructions and follow along as an experimenter reads aloud.3

2.1 Experimental Procedures
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In the first treatment we attempt to replicate the reported disparity between WTP
and WTA to provide a basis of comparison. We measure first willingness to accept in
sessions 1-3, referred to as the Base/WTA sessions. Student participants are given $10 in
cash and a coffee mug bearing the university’s emblem that sells at the bookstore for
$7.00.4 The written instructions are as follows:
Each participant in the experiment just received $10 in cash and a mug.
These are yours to keep. During the experiment you will submit offers
indicating the amount of money you will accept in exchange for the mug.
We will refer to this amount of money as your “offer.”
You will record your offer on the card provided with these instructions.
After recording your offer, please turn your card face down (with your
offer facing down and your participant number on top). An experimenter
will circulate around the room to collect the cards. Once you record your
offer, you cannot revise it and you may be required to exchange your mug
for cash.
The instructions then describe the Vickrey (1961) auction used to elicit WTA with
repeated participation as follows:5
After all participants have recorded their offers on the recording cards, the
experimenters will collect the cards. We will rank all participants’ offers
from highest to lowest. Those with the four lowest offers may be required
to exchange their mug with the experimenters at the fifth lowest offer. If
you are required to exchange your mug for money, you will always
receive at least your offer. Any ties in offers will be resolved randomly.
We will repeat these steps 10 times. At the end of each trial, the offer
price at which transactions may occur is announced (i.e., the fifth lowest
offer). However, only one of the ten trials will be binding. A number
from one to ten will be randomly selected to determine the binding trial.
Are there any questions?
You now own the mug and $10 in your possession. Please indicate the
amount that you are willing to accept in exchange for the mug.
As the instructions indicate, participants are told at the outset that they will be paid based
on the results of only one of the trials, and this trial is chosen by a card draw. Because ex
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ante the students have no way of knowing which trial is the payout trial it is in their
interest to treat all trials equally seriously.
Sessions 4-6 are conducted similarly except that participants are endowed with
$20 and asked to indicate the amount they are willing to pay to acquire a mug
(Base/WTP). The instructions are as follows:
Each participant in the experiment just received $20 in cash. This cash is yours to
keep. The experimenter has in her/his possession 4 mugs. You are free to
examine the mugs. During the experiment you will submit offers indicating the
amount of money you would pay in exchange for a mug. We will refer to this
amount of money as your “offer.”
The instructions continue and describe the Vickrey auction as follows:
After all participants have recorded their offers on the recording cards, the
experimenters will collect the cards. We will rank all participants’ offers from
highest to lowest. Those with the four highest offers may be required to exchange
cash for a mug with the experimenters at the fifth highest offer. Thus, if you are
required to exchange money for a mug, you will never pay more than your offer.
Any ties in offers will be resolved randomly.
Again the procedures are repeated over ten trials and one randomly selected trial
determines the binding outcome.

2.2 The Results
Table 2 reports measures of WTA and WTP using the Vickrey auction. Panel A
reports the average price and median offer across trials and sessions for the Base
treatment. The price in the WTA (WTP) sessions is the fifth (highest) lowest offer. The
table reports the average WTA and WTP for all 10 trials, as well as trials 1-5 and 6-10 for
each treatment. Below the value measurements are z-statistics and corresponding pvalues, the result of Mann-Whitney tests of the null hypothesis that WTA and WTP do
not differ.6
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For the Base treatment, WTA exceeds WTP for prices and offers, at high
significance levels (p < 0.0001). Inferences are unchanged if the tests use data for all
trials, trials 1-5, or trials 6-10. We also estimate a repeated-measures ANOVA to
compare prices across sessions and find that method of elicitation (WTP versus WTA) is
statistically significant (F1,4 = 7.71, p = 0.05).7 Inferences are unaffected when the
repeated-measures ANOVA uses participants’ offers as the dependent measure (F1,46 =
20.61, p < 0.001).
To provide additional insight, we include a histogram of participants’ offers. For
each participant, we compute the median offer over trials 1-10. Figure 1 depicts the
frequency of offers for WTA and WTP sessions, partitioned into five groups. The data
provide further evidence of valuation disparities, arising in participants’ offers. That is,
participants in the WTA sessions provide markedly higher offers than those in the WTP
sessions.8

3. THE DECISION MAKER TREATMENT: MUG ENDOWMENT
The results of our Base treatment are consistent with the widely reported disparity
between WTP and WTA. As argued by others (e.g., Marshall, Knetsch, and Sinden
1986; Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein 2000, 2003), perspective or role is
important to the elicited valuation. In the second treatment, we ask decision makers
(DMs) to provide valuations for others. Unlike Van Boven, Loewenstein, and Dunning
(2003), the DMs’ elicited values do not affect their final wealth: they are endowed at the
beginning of a session and the endowment is theirs to keep, representing experimental
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earnings. The DMs are endowed with a mug and $10, which they take from the
experiment as their compensation. We refer to this as the DM/Mug treatment.

3.1 Experimental Procedures
In sessions 7-12 we again elicit measures of WTA and WTP. The process differs,
however, in that participants (the DMs) are asked to indicate valuations for other students
(the adherents). Twelve inexperienced students are recruited for each session and
randomly divided into groups of eight and four. With six sessions, a total of 72 students
participate in this treatment. The two groups meet in separate rooms and do not see each
other until the conclusion of the experimental session.
In sessions 7-9, all twelve participants are given $10 in cash and a coffee mug
bearing the university’s emblem that sells at the bookstore for $7.00 (DM/Mug/WTA).
The endowment is common knowledge to all twelve participants. In these sessions, the
DMs provide values that determine a price at which the adherents will sell their mug.
The group of eight DMs is directed as follows:
Each participant in this room just received $10 in cash and a mug. In
addition, four participants in another room also have received $10 in cash
and a mug.
During the experiment you will submit offers indicating the amount of
money that participants in the other room will accept in exchange for their
mug. We will refer to this amount of money as your “offer.”
You will record your offer on the card provided with these instructions.
After recording your offer, please turn your card face down (with your
offer facing down and your participant number on top). An experimenter
will circulate around the room to collect the cards. Once you record your
offer, you cannot revise it, and it may represent the amount that
participants in the other room are required to exchange their mugs for
cash.
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As in the Base/WTA treatment (sessions 1-3), the instructions then describe the Vickrey
auction: the fifth lowest offer determines the market valuation. But in this case, the
market valuation is the amount that others may be required to accept in exchange for their
mugs. Again, one of the 10 trials is randomly selected as the binding trial and the fifth
lowest offer determines the market valuation. The instructions continue as follows:
At the conclusion of the experiment, participants in the other room will be
brought into this room and the binding trial will be determined.
Participants from the other room will then exchange their mugs for cash.
Sessions 10-12 are similar in that the eight DMs are endowed with a mug and
$10. Unlike sessions 7-9, the four adherents are endowed with $20. The eight randomly
selected DMs indicate the amount that participants in the other room should pay to
acquire a mug (DM/Mug/WTP). The eight DMs are instructed as follows:
Each participant in this room just received $10 in cash and a mug. These
are yours to keep. In addition, four participants in another room have
received $20 in cash. Participants in the other room will exchange cash
for a mug with the experimenters at an amount determined by you. The
mug they will receive is identical to the mug you received.
During the experiment you will submit offers indicating the amount of
money that participants in the other room will pay to acquire a mug. We
will refer to this amount of money as your “offer.”
You will record your offer on the card provided with these instructions.
After recording your offer, please turn your card face down (with your
offer facing down and your participant number on top). An experimenter
will circulate around the room to collect the cards. Once you record your
offer, you cannot revise it, and it may represent the amount of cash that
participants in the other room are required to exchange for a mug.
The instructions then describe the Vickrey auction with repeated participation.
The procedures are repeated ten times. The instructions end with the following:
At the conclusion of the experiment, participants in the other room will be
brought into this room and the binding trial will be determined.
Participants from the other room will then exchange cash for a mug.
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The four adherents in the other room are informed that they are bound by the
DMs’ offers.

3.2 The Results
Panel B of Table 2 reports measures of WTA and WTP using the Vickrey auction
for the DM/Mug treatment. The table reports the average WTA and WTP for all 10
trials, as well as trials 1-5 and 6-10 for each treatment. Below the value measurements
are z-statistics and corresponding p-values, the result of Mann-Whitney tests of the null
hypothesis that WTA and WTP do not differ.
Unlike the Base treatment, for the DM/Mug treatment, the relationship between
WTP and WTA is reversed and WTP exceeds WTA, again at high levels of significance
(p < 0.0001). Inferences are unchanged if the tests use data for all trials, trials 1-5, or
trials 6-10. A repeated-measures ANOVA comparing prices across WTA and WTP
sessions indicates that the method of elicitation is statistically significant (F1,4 = 23.02, p
= 0.009). In contrast to the often-reported finding that WTA exceeds WTP, valuations of
the DMs in our second treatment lead to a significantly higher purchase price than selling
price for adherents.
As before, we present a histogram of participants’ offers. Figure 2 depicts the
frequency of offers under WTA and WTP partitioned into five groups. The effect of
elicitation method appears to be very pronounced. The median offer of every WTA
participant is less than $6. By comparison, the median offer of the vast majority of WTP
participants (22 of 24) exceeds $6. We also perform a repeated-measures ANOVA using
participants’ offers per trial as the dependent measure and find that method of elicitation
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is statistically significant at p < 0.001 (F1,46 = 82.53). Thus, the results are even stronger
using participants’ offers as the dependent measure.

4. THE DECISION MAKER TREATMENT: CASH ENDOWMENT
When decision makers are endowed with a mug and $10 in cash, the results are
puzzling. With WTP higher than WTA, the DMs’ valuations are quite different than
those of individuals providing valuations for themselves. After reflecting, we wondered
if the DMs’ endowment affected their valuations.9 Because cash is fungible and a natural
referent, we conducted six additional sessions in which the DMs were endowed with $20.
When DMs are only endowed with cash, they are at least as well off as the adherents – in
terms of what is taken away from the experiment. Under such conditions, they may be
able to provide objective valuations. We refer to this as the DM/Cash treatment.

4.1 Experimental Procedures
We conduct six sessions in the DM/Cash treatment (sessions 13-18) in which we
elicit measures of WTA and WTP using valuations for other students. As in the
DM/Mug treatment, a total of 72 students participated. The procedures differ from the
second treatment in that the DMs are all endowed with $20. For WTA (sessions 13-15),
the four adherents are each given $10 in cash and a coffee mug. The DMs indicate the
amount that participants in the other room should accept in exchange for their mugs
(DM/Cash/WTA). The instructions are as follows:
Each participant in this room just received $20 in cash. This cash is yours to
keep. In addition, four participants in another room have received $10 in cash and
a mug. The experimenter has an identical mug in her/his possession. You are
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free to examine the mug. Participants in the other room will exchange their mugs
with the experimenters at an amount determined by you.
The instructions continue as before (i.e., as in the DM/Mug/WTA sessions).
For WTP (sessions 16-18), the procedures are similar except that the four
adherents are endowed with $20 (as are the eight DMs). The DMs indicate the amount
that participants in the other room should pay to acquire a mug (DM/Cash/WTP). The
instructions begin as follows:
Each participant in this room just received $20 in cash. This cash is yours to
keep. In addition, four participants in another room also have received $20 in
cash. The experimenter has in her/his possession 4 mugs. You are free to
examine the mugs. Participants in the other room will exchange cash for a mug
with the experimenters at an amount determined by you.
Again, the instructions continue as before (i.e., as in the DM/Mug/WTP sessions).

4.2 The Results
Panel C of Table 2 reports measures of WTA and WTP for the final treatment
(DM/Cash), in which DMs are endowed only with cash. Unlike the first two treatments,
the valuation gap disappears. Inferences are unchanged if tests use prices or offers for all
trials, trials 1-5, or trials 6-10. Also unlike the first two treatments, a repeated-measures
ANOVA comparing prices across WTA and WTP sessions indicates that the method of
elicitation is not statistically significant (F1,4 = 0.01, p = 0.935). Inferences are similar
using participants’ offers as the dependent measure (F1,46 = 0.86, p = 0.359).
Figure 3 presents a histogram of participants’ offers. An inspection indicates that
the distribution of participants’ median offers is very similar under WTA and WTP.
Therefore, the data indicate that the valuation disparity between WTA and WTP is
eliminated in the DM/Cash sessions.
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The literature has documented the impact of elicitation method on individuals’
valuations. This paper demonstrates the importance of perspective. Commonly, WTA is
elicited by putting the experimental participant in the role of the seller and WTP by
putting the participant in the role of buyer. In our experiment, we first replicate the oftenreported result that sellers demand more to surrender a good than buyers are willing to
pay to acquire the same good (Base treatment). Next we ask participants to act as
decision makers (DMs) who provide valuations for others, referred to as the adherents
(DM/Mug treatment). We endow the DMs with a mug and $10 in cash. We now observe
that the relationship between WTA and WTP is reversed. The DMs’ valuations are
significantly higher when the adherent purchases the mug than when the adherent sells
the mug. The striking change in the gap between WTA and WTP in the DM/Mug
treatment calls for further investigation.
Models of economic behavior recognize that some people care about fairness
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels
2000) and equity is an important factor in bargaining games (Davis and Holt 1993).
Fairness can be modeled as an aversion to inequity, measured in relative terms.
Individuals are self-centered and care about relative standing. While the identification of
the reference group may not be simple, in an experiment the reference group is the set of
participants (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000).
In our experiment, it appears that a DM who cares about relative standing does
not want to be worse off than the adherent. The effect of the DM’s perspective contrasts
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sharply with a seller who wants to collect more or a buyer who wants to pay less. The
behavior of the DMs in the DM/Mug treatment is consistent with recent economic
models of behavior, which predict that relative standing matters. Recall that in the
DM/Cash treatment, DMs are endowed with cash and they are at least as well off as the
adherents. In contrast, in the DM/Mug treatment, WTP may exceed WTA because the
DMs are comparing their standing relative to the adherents. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
provide a model of inequity aversion in which people care about their material payoff
relative to the payoffs of others. In addition, relative standing motivates people’s
behavior in Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) model.
In our experimental setting, the WTP valuation may be high because the DMs
perceive their relative standing to be below that of the mug buyers if the mug buyers pay
a low price for the mug. In the WTP treatment, if the adherents pay, on average, $8.55
for a mug (refer to Panel B of Table 2), they leave the experiment with a mug and, on
average, $11.45. On the other hand, if the adherents acquire a mug for a low price, they
leave the experiment with relatively more than the DMs who have a mug and $10.
In the DM/Cash treatment, DMs may be more objective because they end up in a
better position than the adherents, assuming cash is preferred. Interestingly, WTA and
WTP are quite close to the actual purchase price of the mugs ($7), an amount that was
never disclosed to the participants. Because cash is fungible and its value is clear, it is a
natural referent. With an endowment of $20, relative standing is of less concern to the
DMs and they can focus on the decision to be made.
Our results are consistent with DMs being inequity-averse when their relative
standing is inferior to that of others. By comparison, DMs do not appear to be concerned
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about their standing when they are better off relative to others. In other words, our data
are consistent with preferences being one sided. Individuals do not like differences in
outcomes, at least when they are not doing as well as others. The implication for conflict
resolution is that relative standing can influence perspective-taking ability. Mediators
need to realize that relative standing is an important factor that can influence dispute
resolution.
This paper documents the important effect of perspective and relative standing on
the elicitation of value. Although the disparity between WTA andWTP disappears when
DMs are endowed with cash and asked to provide valuations for others, we cannot
conclude that third party decisions, including those of mediators, are superior. Because
DMs evaluate the effects of a change in position so differently depending on their own
position, they do not necessarily make welfare enhancing decisions for others. Future
research may provide insight into how mediators can better take the perspective of others.
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ENDNOTES

* The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. The authors gratefully
acknowledge the financial support of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and the helpful
comments of Paul Ferraro, Ann Gillette, and Mark Rider.
1

In a recent study, Plott and Zeiller (2005) find that when an incentive compatible

elicitation mechanism is used and participants receive training and are paid for practice
with anonymity, WTA is not significantly higher than WTP. But, the procedural choices
used in Plott and Zeiller effectively strip away strategic considerations, thereby
suppressing the effect of perspective or role.
2

This holds for all sessions (i.e., across all experimental treatments).

3

The complete instructions are available upon request.

4

The fact that the mug can be purchased at the bookstore for $7.00 is not disclosed to

participants at any time.
5

Plott and Zeiller (2005) argue that the elicitation mechanism proposed by Becker,

DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) is the most incentive compatible, with the Vickrey
auction as the next best, in theory. Our design also differs along other dimensions from
Plott and Zieler (2005). For example, in each session they include two unpaid training
rounds, 14 rounds in which a lottery is valued, and one round in which a mug is valued.
6

Inferences are unchanged with Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for all Mann-Whitney tests

reported here and subsequently in this paper.
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7

Period and the interaction of period and method of elicitation are not significant in any

of the repeated measures ANOVAs (p > 0.10) reported in the paper. In determining
statistical significance, the degrees of freedom for within-subject effects are adjusted
using the Greenhouse-Geisser procedure. The adjustment is necessary because, in each
case, Mauchly's test of sphericity is rejected at p < 0.01.
8

Price censoring does not explain the results we report in this paper. In an experiment

that elicits value, problems can arise if participants rationally believe the good can be
purchased at lower prices outside of the laboratory (Harrison, Harstad, and Rutstrom
2004). In our post-experiment questionnaire we asked participants how much they
thought the experimenters paid for the mug. Although price censoring is potentially a
significant methodological problem, we have no evidence to suggest that it affected our
results. There is no consistent pattern in reported costs to the experimenters across
treatments.
9

Future research might examine the impact of perspective and earned income on

valuations. Research shows that notions of fairness change when subjects earn their
position in the payoff distribution, rather than being endowed by the experimenter. For
example, in a dictator game Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002) find that dictators are
more self-interested when they bargain over income that is earned.
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Table 1
Experimental Design
This table summarizes the experimental design. All sessions include 10 trials.

Treatment

Base

Treatment

DM/Mug

DM/Cash

Measure
of Value

Total
Number of
Sessions
Participants
Per Session

Endowment
(8 participants)

WTA

1-3

8

Mug + $10

WTP

4-6

8

$20

Measure
of Value

Total
Number of
Sessions
Participants
Per Session

DM’s
Endowment

Adherent’s
Endowment

(8 participants)

(4 participants)

WTA

7-9

12

Mug + $10

Mug + $10

WTP

10-12

12

Mug + $10

$20

WTA

13-15

12

$20

Mug + $10

WTP

16-18

12

$20

$20

19

Table 2
Prices and Offers
The table reports the average price and median offer across trials and sessions in each treatment. In the
WTA sessions participants are asked to submit offers indicating the amount of money that should be
accepted in exchange for a mug and in the WTP sessions participants are asked to indicate the amount that
should be paid to acquire a mug. The price in the WTA (WTP) sessions is the fifth (highest) lowest offer.
Each session includes 10 trials. The table also reports the average WTA and WTP in trials 1-5 and 6-10 for
each treatment. Below the value measurements are z-statistics and corresponding p-values, the result of
Mann-Whitney tests of the hypothesis that WTA and WTP are equal. Panels A, B, and C, report prices and
offers for the Base, DM/Mug, and DM/Cash treatments, respectively.

Panel A: Base Treatment
Measure

All Trials
WTA
WTP
8.83

Prices

1.34

Trials 1-5
WTA
WTP
9.04

-6.67
(0.000)
10.09

1.64

10.74

-5.31
(0.000)
Panel B: DM/Mug Treatment
All Trials
WTA
WTP
3.79
Prices

8.55

All Trials
WTA
WTP

Prices

6.92

4.00

8.00

3.57

3.94

9.10
-4.72
(0.000)

8.31

3.63

9.24

-5.50
(0.000)

-5.29
(0.000)

Trials 1-5
WTA
WTP

Trials 6-10
WTA
WTP

7.06

6.45

6.92

-1.54
(0.126)
6.72

1.53

Trials 6-10
WTA
WTP

-0.55
(0.582)
7.53

Offers

9.03

Trials 1-5
WTA
WTP

-5.88
(0.000)
Panel C: DM/CashTreatment

6.99

1.89

-4.83
(0.000)

Offers

Measure

-4.69
(0.000)

-4.67
(0.000)
8.91

1.18

-5.25
(0.000)

-6.70
(0.000)
3.71

8.61

-4.69
(0.000)

Offers

Measure

1.51

Trials 6-10
WTA
WTP

6.73

-0.86
(0.391)

20

-0.80
(0.424)
6.74

0.00
(1.000)

7.38

8.26

6.89
-1.31
(0.189)

Figure 1: Frequency of Decision Makers'
Median Offer in the Base Treatment
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Figure 2: Frequency of Decision Makers'
Median Offer in the DM/Mug Treatment
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Figure 3: Frequency of Decision Makers'
Median Offer in the DM/Cash Treatment
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